Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia by Yap, Po Jen
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 25 
Number 3 Asian Courts and the Constitutional 
Politics of the Twenty-First Century 
6-1-2016 
Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia 
Po Jen Yap 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Po J. Yap, Constitutional Fig Leaves in Asia, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 421 (2016). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol25/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2016 Washington International Law Journal Association 
CONSTITUTIONAL FIG LEAVES IN ASIA
Po Jen Yap†
Abstract: Constitutional landscapes in Asia are littered with fig 
leaves. These proverbial fig leaves are legal principles, doctrines, and theories of 
interpretation that judges appeal to when resolving constitutional disputes. This article 
uncovers and examines three constitutional fig leaves that are prevalent and flourishing in 
Asia: 1) formalism and its conceptual variants; 2) the exercise of judicial review that is 
merely symbolic; and 3) the invocation of vacuous constitutional doctrines. This article 
further argues that judicial recourse to fig leaves is not intended to deceive anyone about 
what courts are doing; the fig leaves are on public display merely to demonstrate that 
judges accept the role they are expected to play within their political systems.  For better 
or worse, it would appear that Asian judges believe that these fig leaves are necessary to 
legitimize their actions, and, insofar as Asian judges are doing very little, these legal loin-
cloths are vital to preserve judges’ modesties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional landscapes in Asia are littered with fig leaves. The 
proverbial fig leaves referred to herein are the legal principles, doctrines, and
theories of interpretation that judges appeal to when they resolve 
constitutional disputes. But in the post-legal-realism world that we live in 
today, we have all come to accept that many of the legal techniques judges 
purport to apply are merely rhetorical devices by which they seek to cover
their true motivations. This is so in the West and, as this article explores, it 
is also true in Asia.1
Asian judges, like many of their Western counterparts, would have us
believe that adjudication is merely a mechanical affair that involves applying 
the law to the facts of a specific case. In so doing, judges seek to offer us 
hope that the law can truly be separated from politics, and judges merely 
follow pre-determined rules and exercise little discretion when making 
decisions.2 This is true of the (more) liberal or active courts that exist in 
Hong Kong, India, and Taiwan, and it is equally applicable to the 
conservative or passive courts in Malaysia and Singapore.
† (Dr.) Po Jen Yap; Associate Professor, University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful for all the 
comments provided by Cora Chan, Rosalind Dixon, Christopher Forsyth, Michael Hor, Eric Ip, Theunis 
Roux, and Mark Tushnet. All errors are the author’s own.
1 See generally NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995); Martin Stone, 
Formalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman 
& Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Christopher Forsyth, Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, 
the Sovereignty of Parliament and Judicial Review, 55 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1996).
2 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Getting Beyond Formalism in Constitutional Law: Constitutional Theory 
Matters, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001).
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For the liberal courts in Asia, their reform-minded judges 
understandably need legal fictions to protect themselves from the maelstrom 
of politics when they hand down constitutional decisions that may incur the 
government’s displeasure and/or public outrage. Insofar as these judges can 
point to the Constitution, they can (hopefully) deflect any accusations that 
they have intentionally interfered with the legislative prerogatives of the 
political branches of government.
But conservative courts in Asia need their legal fictions too. The 
political reality is that in both Singapore and Malaysia, the State has been 
governed by the same ruling party or coalition since each nation’s 
independence and will be so governed for the foreseeable future.3 More 
significantly, both countries have experienced judicial crises, which have 
cast a pall over the state of constitutional review. In Malaysia, two Supreme 
Court judges, one of whom was the Lord President, were impeached and 
removed based on trumped-up charges in 1988.4 In Singapore, the judiciary 
was equally shaken after Parliament passed a series of constitutional and 
statutory amendments—which ousted the judicial review of executive 
decisions taken under the Internal Security Act—within a month of the 
Court of Appeal’s ruling. In that decision, the judges held that they would 
henceforth objectively review the President’s exercise of his discretion to 
detain persons under the impugned Act.5 Where legislative and executive 
power is consolidated by a semi-permanent party or coalition, the dominant 
political entity in question can display its displeasure more easily, either by 
eliminating judicial review or even ousting the judges themselves.6 Judges 
operating in such political systems are not oblivious to this fact. Due to
3 The same political coalition, the Alliance Party, has ruled Malaysia since independence. The 
Alliance Party was renamed Barisan Nasional (National Front) in 1974. The People’s Action Party has 
been the ruling party in Singapore since its independence and the party has controlled over 90% of the 
elected seats in Parliament since 1968. 
4 The Malaysian judicial crisis of 1988 was sparked by a letter that Tun Salleh, the Lord President 
of the Supreme Court of Malaysia (now re-titled Chief Justice of the Federal Court of Malaysia), wrote to 
the King on March 26, 1988 about the judiciary’s concern over its deteriorating relationship with the 
government. (Back in 1987, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad had expressed his 
displeasure, on several occasions, over various decisions of the Malaysian courts.) Unfortunately, the King 
was offended by the letter as he believed the royalty would be drawn into a conflict with the government if 
he intervened on the judiciary’s behalf. On May 1, 1988, in an audience with the Prime Minister, the King 
conveyed his displeasure with the letter and asked for appropriate action to be taken against the Lord 
President. As a result, the Lord President and another Supreme Court judge were eventually impeached 
and removed.  For a fuller discussion, see Andrew Harding, The 1988 Constitutional Crisis in Malaysia, 39 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (1990).
5 Chng Suan Tze v. Minister of Home Affairs [1988] 2 SLR 132. 
6 See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 82–83 (2003).
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external political constraints, judges likely feel compelled to rule in favor of
their government or at most rule against the government in modest ways. 
But these judges, concerned about their own legitimacy in the public eye,
would also feel the need to convince the people that they are able to 
discharge their judicial duties without fear or favor, even if they can 
realistically achieve very little. Therefore, fig leaves are used by passive 
judges to justify to the public that a pro-government result was inevitable as 
it was merely mandated by the law, rather than the result of any judicial 
capitulation to legislative and executive power.
This article uncovers and examines three constitutional fig leaves that 
are prevalent and flourishing in Asia: 1) formalism and its conceptual 
variants; 2) the exercise of judicial review that is merely symbolic; and 3)
the invocation of vacuous constitutional doctrines. One must note at the 
outset that the fig leaves identified in this article are not consistently applied 
in the jurisdictions surveyed, as judges in different countries rely on varying 
types of fig leaves. For example, symbolic review is only applied by passive 
judges in Malaysia and Singapore, while relatively liberal courts in India and 
Taiwan do not appeal to formalism and its conceptual variants during 
constitutional adjudication.
Recent literature on constitutional law has generally explored the 
political climates within Asian jurisdictions that account for the strategic 
behavior of their judges, but there has been no scholarly attempt to examine 
the doctrinal devices or fig leaves (as termed in this article) that Asian 
judges apply during constitutional adjudication. 7 In short, the current 
literature explains why Asian judges behave strategically, but not how they 
do so at a retail level in individual constitutional cases.8 At the outset, one
should note that this article does not seek to make any Westphalian
assumptions about judicial review. Rather, the article’s central thesis is 
premised on the common, accepted argument that in our globalized world 
today, insofar as Asia has differed in its approach to human rights, this 
7 See generally id.; Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, The Emergence of East Asian 
Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 (2011); Thio Li-ann, Between Apology 
and Apogee, Autochthony: The ‘Rule of Law’ Beyond the Rules of Law in Singapore, 2012 SING. J.L. STUD.
269; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East Asian Experiences, 
8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 885 (2010), Eric Ip, The Evolution of Constitutional Adjudication in the Chinese 
Special Administrative Regions: Theory and Evidence, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 799 (2013).
8 I have chosen to examine Asian jurisdictions that best illustrate my central arguments. 
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distinction is “maintained not by ‘natural’ culture but by a will to differ.”9
This applies to both lawmakers and judges. Therefore, there is nothing 
inherently Asian about the choices that the judges have made; the repertoire 
of fig leaves Asian courts appeal to is merely used to disguise the normative 
choices made by their judges to override or succumb to domestic politics. 
Finally, this article concludes by arguing that judicial recourse to these 
constitutional fig leaves seeks not to deceive anyone about what the courts 
are doing. The fig leaves are on public display merely to demonstrate that 
judges accept the role they are expected to play within their political 
systems. For better or worse, it would appear that some Asian judges 
believe these fig leaves are necessary to lend legitimacy to their actions.
Insofar as judges are doing very little, these legal loin-cloths are vital to 
preserve their modesties.
II. UNCOVERING THE FIG LEAVES 
A. Formalism 
Formalism refers to a belief that judges are able to deduce “objective 
and apolitical legal answers from abstract legal rules, principles or 
categories, without recourse to policy considerations.” 10 There are three 
variants of formalism exemplified in Asian case law, and this article
explores them in turn.
i. Principles/Policy Dichotomy 
The first variant of formalism is the distinction judges draw between 
legal principles (rights) and policy. The genesis of this dichotomy can be 
traced to Professor Dworkin’s argument that a policy is a “standard that sets 
out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, 
political, or social feature of the community,” 11 whereas a principle is a 
“standard that is to be observed . . . because it is a requirement of justice or 
fairness[.]”12 The implication of this distinction is that the vindication of 
legal principles falls within the province of the courts, while policy is a 
matter exclusively for the legislature to decide. In the same vein, Professor 
9 Simon Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L.J. 743, 748 (1996). 
See also Michael Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human Rights and 
Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998).
10 Jeff King, Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28 OXFORD J.L.S. 409, 414 (2008).
11 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22 (1977).
12 Id.
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Jeffrey Jowell has been explicit about the distinct spheres of influence the 
two branches of government occupy: 
[L]egislative authority inevitably contains a wide area of 
discretion to make social and economic policy, over which the 
courts have no dominium. It is not for the judges to second-
guess the legislature on utilitarian considerations of the social 
good. Their role is strictly confined to the limited issue of 
whether the various inherent elements of democracy have been 
infringed by other branches of government and therefore cannot 
be sustained.13
This principle/policy dichotomy was expressly endorsed by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew v AG.14 In this 
case, a private individual sought to bring judicial review proceedings against 
the Singapore Government, alleging that its contingent financial loan to the 
International Monetary Fund violated Article 144(1) of the Singapore 
Constitution.15 The Court ultimately rejected the applicant’s claim on the 
basis that he had no locus standi to bring a suit in the first place as he, a 
mere private individual, was “unable to assert any rights—private or 
public—to the alleged breach of duty, . . . his claim is brought in the public 
interest.”16
More relevant here, the Singapore Court of Appeal explained that:
Suffice it to say that we see much value in maintaining the 
Dworkinian policy/principle divide here; this finds expression 
in the courts being concerned only with the individual’s rights 
and interests, and not matters of public policy, which rightfully 
remains in the remit of proper political process.17
In the same vein, when the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Mat 
Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Pendakwa Raya recently upheld the constitutionality 
13 Jeffrey Jowell, Parliamentary Sovereignty Under the New Constitutional Hypothesis, PUB. L. 562, 
578–79 (2006).
14 Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew v A.G. [2014] 1 SLR 345.
15 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 144(1). (“No guarantee or loan shall 
be given or raised by the Government: (a) except under the authority of any resolution of Parliament with 
which the President concurs; (b) under the authority of any law to which this paragraph applies unless the 
President concurs with the giving or raising of such guarantee or loan; or (c) except under the authority of 
any other written law.”).
16 Jeyeretnam Kenneth Andrew, 1 SLR 345 at [51].
17 Id. at [56].
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of the Sedition Act, which imposes criminal liability on the sale and 
distribution of seditious publications, the judges were adamant that the 
draconian nature of the law was not suited for judicial resolution. 18 As 
observed by Justice Abdul Malik Bin Ishak for the unanimous Court: “The 
question whether the impugned Act is ‘harsh and unjust’ is a question of 
policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and therefore not meet for
judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very deeply into the very 
being of Parliament.”19
Lest one think that this judicial appeal to the principle/policy divide is 
a rhetorical device applied only by conservative judges, liberal judges in 
Asia have equally intervened and overturned social policies in the name of 
vindicating rights. For example, in the landmark Hong Kong constitutional 
decision of W v. Registrar of Marriages, the Hong Kong Court of Final 
Appeal (C.F.A.), by a four-to-one majority, held that the pre-existing 
statutory prohibition against post-operative transsexuals from marrying in 
their acquired gender violated their constitutional right to marry. 20 In
contrast, the dissenting judge, Chan P.J., viewed the recognition of a post-
operative transsexual’s acquired gender for the purpose of marriage as 
involving a change in social policy, and, in his opinion, such changes should 
be left to the legislature. As observed by Chan P.J.:
The role of the court is to give effect to a change in an existing 
social policy, not to introduce any new social policy. The 
former is a judicial process but the latter is a matter for the 
democratic process. Social policy issues should not be decided 
by the court.21
The judicial bifurcation of principles/rights from policy, as examined 
above, rests on a questionable but common assumption that courts merely 
interpret legal principles or rights, while legislatures are supreme in their 
exercise of policy, in particular over social policy. However, this distinction 
between “principles,” or “rights,” and “policy” is untenable. Every allegedly
rights-infringing legislation stems from a social policy that lawmakers 
sought to pursue. When the Malaysian legislature criminalizes the sale of 
18 According to Section 3(1)(a) of the Sedition Act, a publication would have a seditious tendency if 
it would “bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against any Government.” Sedition Act 
(Cap 290, 2013 Rev Ed) s 3(1)(a).
19 Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v. Pendakwa Raya [2013] M.L.J. 1342, 114.
20 W v. Registrar of Marriages, [2013] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 90.
21 Id. at 192.
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“seditious” publications, it may be pursuing a certain social policy on public 
order while concurrently carving away citizens’ right to free expression. 
Similarly, when the CFA vindicates the constitutional right of post-operative 
transsexuals to marry, the CFA has equally (and rightly) displaced the 
government’s social policy on marriage. Thus, there is no self-evident way 
by which one can delineate the domain of “rights” from “policy,” such that 
courts should be stewards only of the former and not the latter.22 Insofar as 
judges appeal to this distinction, they are merely seeking refuge behind a 
legal fig leaf. This convenient dichotomy allows Asian courts to justify their 
activism when invalidating primary legislation, and/or their passivity in 
allowing controversial statutes to stand, by asserting they have no choice in 
the resolution of the matter at all, that is, that the judicial role mandates the 
substantive outcome. 
ii. Originalism
Originalism, as a constitutional theory, presents itself as a resolution 
to the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. Insofar as courts 
only implement the original understanding of the constitution, judges 
adjudicate in a democratically legitimate way, as they are merely enforcing 
the original meaning of the constitutional text that was duly enacted by the 
people via their representatives.23 It is thus believed that originalism, as a 
mode of constitutional interpretation, may best promote predictability and 
also prevent illegitimate constitutional change under the guise of judicial 
interpretation.24
This brand of originalism has been termed “hard originalism,” and is 
largely defended by judges and scholars who seek to transform 
constitutional law into a system of rules, such that judicial review becomes 
more democratic by virtue of its connection to past judgments of the 
constitutional framers.25 Consequently, judicial discretion is also fettered 
and legal predictability enhanced by this judicial reliance on historical 
rulings.26 Originalists often caution that if judges are allowed to stray from 
22 Po Jen Yap, Defending Dialogue, PUB. L. 527, 539 (2012).
23 Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J.
JURIS. 255, 261 (2002).
24 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 143–160 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1998).
25 CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173 (1996).  
26 See generally BORK, supra note 24; Scalia, supra note 24.
 
                                                            
428 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
 
the original understanding of the Constitution, they will be given free rein to 
amend the Constitution, and therefore judges (non-elected officials) would 
be imposing norms that the people have not accepted through their 
democratically elected representatives.27
An originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution was 
explicitly endorsed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Yong Vui Kong v.
Public Prosecutor.28 In that case, the accused was sentenced to death by the 
trial judge under the Misuse of Drugs Act for trafficking 47.27 grams of 
diamorphine, a controlled drug. On appeal, the accused argued that the 
mandatory nature of the death penalty (MDP) imposed by the impugned 
statute was not “in accordance with law” as required under Article 9(1) of 
the Singapore Constitution, as the expression “law” enshrined under Article 
9(1) excluded inhuman forms of punishment.29 Accordingly, he argued he
could not be validly deprived of his life under the statute.
Specifically, counsel for the accused asked the Court to follow a series 
of Privy Council decisions from the Caribbean States where the Law Lords 
of the United Kingdom had overturned the MDP imposed by the respective 
State laws.30 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal flatly rejected these cases’
applicability. According to the Chief Justice for the unanimous court,
Singapore’s due process clause was based on its equivalent in the 1963 
Malaysian Federal Constitution, which was likewise based on the 1957 
Malayan Constitution drafted pursuant to the advice of the Federation of 
Malayan Constitutional Commission chaired by Lord Reid (the Reid 
Commission). 31 Unlike those foreign decisions, which involved 
constitutions that expressly prohibited inhuman punishments, the Chief 
Justice opined that the Singapore Constitution did not expressly include such 
a prohibition. In his view, the fact that the Reid Commission did not 
recommend an express prohibition against inhuman punishment, even 
though such a provision existed in the European Convention on Human 
Rights—an instrument that applied in all the British colonies (including 
Singapore and Malaysia) prior to their independence—clearly illustrated that 
27 See generally Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119 (1996).
28 Yong Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor [2010] SING. C.A. 20.
29 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 9(1) (“No person shall be deprived 
of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law.”).
30 See generally Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 App. Cas. 235; Fox v. The Queen, [2002] 2 App. Cas.
284; R v. Hughes, [2002] 1 App. Cas. 259.
31 Singapore became a constituent state of Malaysia in 1963 and gained full independence as a 
sovereign republic in 1965. 
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the omission was deliberate and was not due to ignorance or oversight.32
Furthermore, the Chief Justice noted that in 1969 the Singapore Government
had unambiguously rejected a proposal by Singapore’s Constitutional 
Commission to initiate a constitutional amendment that would have 
expressly prohibited the state imposition of inhuman punishment. 33
Therefore, according to the Court of Appeal, it was “not legitimate for this 
court to read into Art[icle] 9(1) a constitutional right which was decisively 
rejected by the Government in 1969, especially given the historical context 
in which that right was rejected.”34 Ergo, the Court of Appeal espoused an 
originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution and would in turn 
only invalidate “legislation of so absurd or arbitrary a nature that it could not 
possibly have been contemplated by [Singapore’s] constitutional framers as 
being ‘law’ when they crafted the constitutional provisions protecting 
fundamental liberties.”35
However, the espousal of “hard originalism” as the preferred theory of 
constitutional adjudication in Singapore by the Court of Appeal in Yong Vui 
Kong is not unproblematic. First, the text of Singapore’s Fundamental 
Liberties Clauses, which include the due process clause, was not deliberated 
upon by a Constituent Assembly of the independent state in question. 
Instead, upon gaining independence from Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore 
legislature simply made most Fundamental Liberties provisions found in the 
Malaysia Federal Constitution applicable to Singapore via the Republic of 
Singapore Independence Act.36 Certainly, the fact that the legislature of a 
newly sovereign republic consciously adopted those provisions conferred 
upon these Singaporean liberties a legal life of their own. Mere enactment 
of the law alone, however, does not provide a clue as to the original meaning 
the framers of the Singapore Constitution attached to those provisions they 
adopted. Furthermore, since the Singapore constitutional framers did not 
deliberate upon the phraseology of the Fundamental Liberties Clauses, but 
merely imported them as a matter of expedience from Malaysia, one does 
32 Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [62].
33 The Singapore Constitutional Commission was tasked by the Singapore government in 1966 with 
making recommendations on constitutional changes that might be necessary to protect the rights of 
minorities in Singapore.
34 Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [72].
35 Id. at [16].
36 For example, the Singapore Parliament deliberately omitted to include Article 13 of the Federal 
Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and provides for adequate compensation for 
depreciation of this right. See generally KEVIN TAN & MIN-YEO THIO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 74 (2010); Kevin YL Tan, State and Institution Building Through the 
Singapore Constitution 1965–2005, in EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE 
CONSTITUTION 54 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Tan eds., 2010). 
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wonder whether it is even possible to discern the original meaning they
attached to those adopted provisions. At best, one can try to discern the 
original intent of the framers (and the members of the Reid Constitutional 
Commission) when the Malaysian Constitution was drafted and adopted, but 
it would be a very curious state of affairs for Singaporean judges in modern 
independent Singapore to give effect to and be fettered by the original intent 
of another nation state’s constitutional framers.37
Second, the Court of Appeal’s originalist mode of interpretation in 
Yong Vui Kong is also problematic. The Chief Justice was unwilling to 
accept that Article 9(1) could be interpreted to include an implied general 
prohibition against inhuman punishment, as the Singapore Government had 
unambiguously rejected a proposal by a Constitutional Commission to 
amend the Constitution and provide for such an express right in 1969.
However, the Fundamental Liberties Clauses of the Singapore Constitution 
came into effect in 1965, the same year Singapore gained independence.  
Hence, it is unclear, even based on an originalist understanding of the 
Singapore Constitution, whether it was legitimate for the Court to discern 
the original intent of the constitutional framers in 1965—when they 
imported the applicable Fundamental Liberties Clauses from Malaysia—
from a Parliamentary decision made four years later to reject a proposal that 
would have provided for an express prohibition against inhuman 
punishment.
Third, even if one assumes that the intent of the constitutional framers 
in 1969 in rejecting a constitutional prohibition against inhuman punishment 
mirrored a similar intent among the framers in 1965, this would mean that 
whatever recommendations the Constitutional Commission made in 1966, 
but were not taken up subsequently by the Government in 1969, should also 
not be judicially deemed constitutional rights. In particular, the Singapore 
Government in 1969 also refused to enact a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have expressly prohibited the use of torture in 
Singapore. Fortunately for Singapore, however, the Court of Appeal proved 
unwilling to take its own argument to its logical conclusion. As observed by 
the Chief Justice, “this conclusion does not mean that, because the proposed 
[constitutional amendment] included a prohibition against torture, an Act of 
Parliament that permits torture can form part of ‘law’ for the purposes of 
37 For a fuller discussion of this case, see Po Jen Yap, Constitutionalising Capital Crimes: Judicial 
Virtue or Originalism Sin?, SING. J.L. STUD. 281 (2011).
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Art[icle] 9(1).” 38 Whilst one should certainly applaud this judicial 
concession, this pronouncement is very puzzling. As a matter of logic, if the 
Chief Justice was reluctant to expand, via an interpretive exercise, the scope 
of Article 9(1) to include a constitutional prohibition against inhuman 
punishment because Parliament had deliberately refused to confer this 
constitutional provision expressly, surely this reasoning must also bar any 
elevation of a prohibition against torture to a constitutional right. After all,
this proposal was deliberately rejected by the Government in 1969. The 
Court of Appeal interestingly justified this distinction on the basis that the 
Singapore Minister of Home Affairs in 1987 had explicitly recognized that 
torture was wrong39 and that torture, insofar as it caused harm to another’s 
body with criminal intent, had already been criminalized under the 
Singapore Penal Code.40 With respect, the logic of this argument eludes me. 
One must wonder how a mere statement from the Home Minister during 
Parliamentary Debates in 1987 would license the Court of Appeal, in an 
originalist understanding of the Singapore Constitution, to elevate a 
prohibition against torture into a constitutional right. Additionally, the fact 
that bodily assault is a crime in Singapore would surely not have any bearing 
on this matter.  Perhaps the Chief Justice was a “faint-hearted originalist”
and Singapore’s constitutional jurisprudence will be better for it. 41
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal, whilst recognizing that Article 9(1) 
prohibits torture, went on to state unequivocally that “currently, no domestic 
legislation permits torture,” thereby insulating all current official state 
practices from challenges on this ground, and in particular judicial caning, a 
commonplace punishment for vandalism and rape in Singapore.42
Judicial reliance on originalism persisted in Lim Meng Suang v.
Attorney General, where the Singapore Court of Appeal upheld a 
constitutional challenge brought against Section 377A of the Penal Code, 
which criminalizes any act of gross indecency between men, even where the 
conduct is consensual and performed in the privacy of one’s home.43 The 
plaintiffs were two gay partners who argued that the impugned provision 
violated their right to equality, as protected under Article 12 of the 
38 Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
39 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (29 July 1987) vol. 49 at cols 1491–92 (Prof. S. 
Jayakumar, Minister for Home Affairs).
40 Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
41 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1988–1989).
42 Yong Vui Kong, SING. C.A. 20 at [75].
43 Lim Meng Suang v. Attorney General [2014] SING. C.A. at [53]. Same-sex intercourse between 
women was legislatively omitted.
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Singapore Constitution.44 According to the Court of Appeal, the applicants’ 
constitutional right to equality was not violated. In particular, the Court held 
that, during constitutional adjudication, “the duty of a court is to interpret 
statutes enacted by the legislature; it cannot amend or modify statutes.”45
Since the legislative objective of Section 377A when it was introduced into 
colonial Singapore by the British in 1938 was to criminalize grossly indecent 
acts between men, even in private, 46 there was a rational relation between 
the legislative differentia embodied in Section 377A and the object of the 
law. 47 Arguably, the Court was appealing to an originalist 
understanding of the equal protection clause in Singapore’s Constitution.
Given that Singapore’s equal protection clause would not have been 
originally understood in 1965—when the Constitution entered into force—to 
prohibit the criminalization of same-sex intercourse between men, the court 
could not give this constitutional clause an “updated” reading, and declare 
this law a breach of equal protection in 2013.
However, even if a state practice, such as the criminalization of
sodomy or the use of capital punishment, was generally accepted at the time 
the constitutional provisions were adopted, this does not establish that the 
framers intended to constitutionalize that statutory practice for subsequent 
generations to obey. It is equally possible that the framers had given little 
thought to that issue, or were divided on the issue and preferred to let future 
generations decide the matter for themselves. This interpretation is also 
more consistent with a textual reading of the constitutional provisions. The 
Singapore framers, like framers of other national constitutions, have used 
both specific and broad provisions within the constitutional text, thus 
indicating that separate clauses should be interpreted at different levels of 
generality. Where the framers wanted the constitutional clauses to be read 
strictly, they used very specific and particular words. For example, a 
member of the Singapore Parliament must be “of the age of 21 years or 
above.” 48 The Singapore Constitution does not say that a Member of 
Parliament must be of sufficient maturity or age. Similarly, the Singapore 
Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from the 
date of its first sitting and shall then stand dissolved.49 The Constitution 
44 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art. 12(1) (“All persons are equal before 
the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.”).
45 Lim Meng Suang, SING. C.A. 53 at [77].
46 Id. at [135].
47 Id. at [153].  
48 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art. 44(2)(b).
49 Id. art 65(4). 
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does not say that the Singapore Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall 
continue for a reasonable period of years and shall then stand dissolved.  
Given that the Singapore framers intentionally left the constitutional 
provisions enshrining terms like “in accordance with law” or “equal 
protection” ambiguously worded, fully comprehending that the language 
was not specific and could be interpreted in various ways, the choice to 
adopt a broader principle must thus be respected. After all, if a prohibition’s
reach is restricted to the practices that were thought to run afoul of the 
Constitution at the time the provisions were adopted, it would leave no room 
for reasoned adjudication of new practices that scientific and technological 
advancements or changed socio-economic circumstances bring about. 50
Thus, such broadly phrased constitutional clauses must embody abstract 
principles rather than merely encapsulate and enshrine historical practices. 
As Professor Jack Balkin has observed: “[Constitutional adopters] 
choose vague standards or abstract principles because they want to channel 
political judgment but delegate the task of construction and application to 
future generations.”51
Fidelity to the Constitution requires judges to respect the framers’ 
choice of rules or standards in the bill of rights. Instead, the Singapore 
judiciary has placed dispositive weight on the expectations of the 
constitutional framers in deciding whether an impugned legislation is 
constitutional. Such attempts to shackle the Constitution to the framers’ 
original, specific interpretation of the text (as “hard originalism” would 
require) may indeed be inconsistent with their original intent of using vague, 
open-textured language to enact an enduring instrument with standards that 
allow future generations of lawmakers and judges to design and build over 
time through the processes of constitutional construction.52
Therefore, it is evident that judicial recourse to “hard originalism” in 
Singapore is not mandated by the text or history of the country’s supreme 
law. Rather, it is a consequence of the judiciary’s deliberate choice to defer 
to the contemporary policy choices of the dominant People’s Action Party 
(PAP) government, which has ruled Singapore without interruption since the 
nation’s independence and has not taken kindly to robust judicial review. 
50 Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 580 
(1998).
51 Jack M. Balkin, Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism, 2012 U. IL. L. REV. 815, 817. 
52 Id. at 815–16.
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Originalism, as practiced in Singapore, is at heart a rhetorical mask to 
disguise judicial passivity and constitutional history that has been relied 
upon as a “convenient proxy” for judicial inaction.53
iii. Textualism 
Textualism is an interpretive method that allows judges to derive the 
meaning of the Constitution from its language, as situated within the 
linguistic practice of the community and alongside accepted canons of 
interpretation. Proponents of textualism, like advocates of “hard 
originalism,” argue that the role of a judge is merely to interpret the law, as 
enacted by the legislature. In their view, the word “interpret” is a transitive 
verb; that is, judges must interpret text.54 If judges were to depart from the 
text of the Constitution, they would be imposing prescriptions that have not 
been endorsed by the political process on society.
An excellent illustration of textualism in practice would be the High 
Court of Singapore’s decision in Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home 
Affairs. 55 In that case, three applicants commenced proceedings seeking 
declarations that the Police Commissioner had acted unlawfully in ordering 
them to disperse when they engaged in a peaceful protest outside a 
government building. A central issue was whether the Miscellaneous 
Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act could validly curtail their right to 
assemble. The High Court acknowledged that every Singapore citizen has 
the right to assemble peaceably, but the learned judge noted that Article 14(2) 
of the Singapore Constitution also qualifies this right by allowing the 
government to impose “such restrictions as it considers necessary or 
expedient in the interest of . . . public order.” Notably, the High Court 
observed as follows: 
It bears emphasis that the phrase ‘necessary or expedient’
confers on Parliament an extremely wide discretionary power 
and remit that permits a multifarious and multifaceted approach 
towards achieving any of the purposes specified in Art 14(2) of 
the Constitution . . . there can be no questioning of whether the 
legislation is ‘reasonable.’ All that needs to be established is a 
53 Michael Hor, Singapore’s Death Penalty: The Beginning of the End?, in CONFRONTING CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN ASIA: HUMAN RIGHTS, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC OPINION 149 (Roger Hood & Surya 
Deva eds., 2013).
54 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, Preface to READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
55 Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs, [2006] 1 SLR 582.
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nexus between the object of the impugned law and one of the 
permissible subjects stipulated in Art[icle] 14(2) of the 
Constitution.56
Simply put, the High Court of Singapore was arguing that the literal 
text of the Singapore Constitution did not authorize the judiciary to examine 
the reasonableness of the impugned legislative measure. According to the 
learned judge, the constitutional right to free speech and assembly in 
Singapore is expressly qualified such that the government may impose “such 
restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient.”57 Given that the terms 
“reasonable” and “expedient” are used disjunctively, the court concluded 
there was no need for the courts to examine whether the impugned 
legislation is reasonable at all. Mere legislative expedience would suffice to 
justify the passage of any rights-infringing law on free assembly.  
Lest one think that textualism is an interpretive method that is merely 
employed by conservative judges, it is interesting that textual arguments 
have been equally deployed by judges in Hong Kong for liberal causes.  In
Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, the Hong Kong C.F.A. had to 
determine the validity of a statutory provision that prevented Chinese 
citizens, born in Hong Kong to Mainland Chinese parents, from being 
conferred the constitutional right of permanent residency in Hong Kong at 
the time of their birth.58 In interpreting Article 24(2)(1)59 of the Basic Law, 
the constitutional provision at issue, the Hong Kong Government wanted the 
Court to uphold the impugned immigration legislation on the basis that it 
was consistent with the view expressed in various extrinsic legislative aids, 
including the Preparatory Committee of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region’s Opinions.60 Nevertheless, the C.F.A. unanimously 
rejected this view. 
As observed by Chief Justice Li on behalf of the Court: “[T]he courts 
are bound to give effect to the clear meaning of the (constitutional) language. 
The courts will not on the basis of any extrinsic materials depart from that 
56 Id. at [para. 49].
57 Id. at [para. 14]. 
58 Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533.
59 Xianggang Jiben Fa (Basic Law of Hong Kong) Art. 24 §(2)(1): “The permanent residents of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be. . .Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after 
the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”
60 The Preparatory Committee for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was a body 
established by the People's Republic of China government on January 26, 1996, in preparation for China’s 
resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997. 
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clear meaning and give the language a meaning which the language cannot 
bear.”61 Given that the Basic Law explicitly provides “permanent residents 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be . . . Chinese 
citizens born in Hong Kong,” the C.F.A. could seize upon the express 
phraseology of the constitutional text and reject the use of extrinsic 
legislative materials to aid its interpretation, ruling boldly in favor of the 
claimants. In so doing, the CFA also cunningly avoided having to give legal 
effect to extrinsic materials issued by the Central Government in Beijing
after the promulgation of the Basic Law. 
Judicial application of textualism in both cases is not without
problems. In Singapore, where parliamentary supremacy was expressly 
rejected in favor of a post-independence constitutional arrangement that 
places fundamental rights beyond the reach of majoritarian politics, it is 
logically inconceivable that the constitutional right to free assembly can be 
circumvented merely when it is expedient for the government of the day to 
override it. Even if one is an ardent textualist, one may note that the 
absurdity doctrine is a well-accepted canon of interpretation. As Lord 
Wensleydale observed in the 1857 decision Grey v. Pearson:
[I]n construing . . . all written instruments, the grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that 
would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or 
inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case, the 
grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be avoided, 
so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther.62
This, in essence, echoes Blackstone’s observation that “where words 
bear . . . a very absurd signification, if literally understood, we must a little 
deviate from the received sense of them.”63 Therefore, in Chee Siok Chin, it
would have been perfectly plausible, even as a textualist, for the learned 
judge to apply the absurdity doctrine and hold that the Singapore 
Constitution only authorizes Parliament to pass such legislative restrictions 
that are necessary and expedient in the interest of public order. Otherwise, 
any ordinary legislation that Parliament passes to further public order may 
61 Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] 57 H.K.C.F.A.R. 547. See also Eric C. Ip, 
The Politics of Constitutional Common Law in Honk Kong Under Chinese Sovereignty, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 
565, 582–83 (2016).
62 Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61, 106 (U.K. H.L.).
63 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 34 (Bernard. C. Gavit ed., Washington Law 
Book Co. 1941) (1892).
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automatically trump the constitutionally enshrined right to free assembly. 
By reading the words “necessary” and “expedient” conjunctively, rather than 
disjunctively, the court would have corrected an obviously absurd and 
unintended interpretation that would allow an exception to swallow the 
constitutional rule that seeks to safeguard citizens’ fundamental freedoms. 
The key feature of textualism, as applied in the Chin Siok Chin decision, is
that it allows judges to focus on the literal language of the constitutional text, 
narrow the range of decisional opportunities open to them, and leave it to the 
legislature to make any changes to the impugned legislation.
On the other hand, in the Hong Kong C.F.A. decision Chong Fung 
Yuen, textualism was deployed to serve progressive causes, but the court’s
denial of choice in the matter was equally disingenuous. Even though the 
text of the Basic Law expressly provides that permanent residents of the 
H.K.S.A.R. shall be Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong, constitutional 
rights in Hong Kong (or elsewhere) are rarely upheld as absolute trumps.64
Therefore, it would be wholly possible for the C.F.A. to have devised a 
doctrinal test to examine whether it was reasonable to exclude Chinese 
citizens, who are born in Hong Kong but to non-Hong Kong Permanent 
Residents, from being conferred the right of abode at the time of their birth. 
By purporting to apply a textual reading of Article 24, the C.F.A. sought to 
insulate itself from any public outrage the judges were deliberately 
conferring upon children born to Mainland Chinese tourists, illegal 
immigrants, or over-stayers, the constitutional right of permanent residency 
at the time of their birth in Hong Kong.
The appeal of textualism is that it allows judges to defend the legal 
result they hope to achieve by disguising their choice “in the language of 
definitional inexorability.” 65 This “our Constitution made us do it”
argument allows judges to deny that they have other options in the matter, 
and obfuscates questions on how the judicial decision was made and whether 
it could have been made differently.66 But the reality is there is almost 
always an alternative reading of the Constitution the court wants to disavow, 
but the Court pretends it does not exist. 
64 For example, the Hong Kong C.F.A. has applied the proportionality doctrine to assess legislative 
restrictions on the constitutional right to equality (Secretary for Justice v. Yau Yuk Lung, [2007] 3
H.K.L.R.D 903), and the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty (H.K.S.A.R. v. 
Lam Kwong Wai, [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808), even though Basic Law does not expressly enshrine any 
limitations on these rights.  
65 Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513–14 (1988).
66 Id.
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B. Symbolic Review 
In a democratic state committed to constitutional supremacy, 
judges are generally vested with the power to invalidate legislation that is 
deemed inconsistent with enshrined fundamental liberties. In principle, 
constitutional review serves as a counter-majoritarian check against popular 
will as expressed in legislation. Yet in Singapore and Malaysia, as discussed 
above, the courts operate within an illiberal political system with a dominant 
ruling government that has been able to displace constitutional decisions and
even oust judges with remarkable ease. In theory, these courts are supposed 
to stand as bulwarks against any governmental incursion into individual 
liberties. In reality, however, the judiciary has engaged in constitutional 
review that is merely cursory in nature. Formally, judges are committed to 
the separation of powers, and as a matter of rhetoric they openly proclaim 
that they will always generously interpret constitutional rights. 67
Nonetheless, in practice judges in Malaysia and Singapore have engaged in a
merely symbolic review of state action, for fear of reversals or reprisals.
In Malaysia, since the Constitutional Crisis of 1988, which saw the 
removal of the Lord President and another Supreme Court Justice, the 
Federal Court (the nation’s court of final resort) has stopped exercising its 
prerogative to invalidate legislation deemed incompatible with the nation’s 
constitutional bill of rights.68
Recently, in the ostensibly landmark Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress v. Menteri Tenaga decision,69 the Federal Court of Malaysia held 
that an applicant, in the context of public interest litigation (P.I.L.), merely 
had to show that he or she had a “real and genuine interest in the subject 
matter.” 70 In so doing, the court overruled longstanding precedent that 
required applicants to establish the infringement of a private right or the 
suffering of special damages before they would have standing for P.I.L.
67 Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1979–1980] 2 SLR(R) 710 (Singapore C.A.).  See also
Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs, [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525 (Singapore C.A.); Dato’ Seri Ir Hj 
Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaluddin v. Dato’ Seri Dr Zambry bin Abdul Kadir, [2010] 2 M.L.J. at para. 25 
(Malaysian C.A.); Ketua Polis Negara v Abdul Ghani Haroon, [2001] 4 M.L.J. 11, 12 (Malaysia H.C.).  
68 For a discussion on how the Malaysian judiciary’s interpretative approaches have evolved since 
the Constitutional Crisis of 1988, see generally Yvonne Tew, On the Uneven Journey to Constitutional 
Redemption: The Malaysian Judiciary and Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 669 (2016). 
69 Malaysian Trade Union Congress v. Menteri Tenaga, [2014] M.L.J. 92.
70 Id. at para. 58.
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cases.71 In this instance, the Malaysian federal government (the Selangor 
state government) and a consortium had entered into a tri-partite Agreement 
allowing the consortium to raise tariffs on the water it was supplying by 15% 
if certain performance targets were met. The Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress, a society of trade unions, applied for judicial review when the 
Government refused to disclose a copy of the Agreement and the Audit 
Report that justified an increase in water tariffs. While the Federal Court 
laudably agreed that the Trade Congress had the locus standi to bring 
judicial review proceedings against the government, the Court quickly 
dashed all hopes that it was remotely interested in providing any substantive 
relief. The Court held the Audit Report could not be disclosed, as it was 
tabled and deliberated in a Cabinet meeting and was therefore an “official 
secret.”72 As for the Agreement, the Court held it could not be disclosed 
because it contained a non-disclosure clause forbidding dissemination to 
third parties without prior mutual agreement between the parties.73 It would 
appear then that the “liberalizing” effect of this new locus standi rule would 
have a negligible impact on the substantive development of P.I.L. actions in 
Malaysia. In the future, the government would merely need to table any 
documents for the Cabinet’s deliberation to make them immune from 
disclosure. Similarly, private actors merely had to sign non-disclosure 
agreements to foil any third-party attempts at discovery. Therefore, any 
hopes for change in this area are illusory.
In the same vein, in Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney General, the 
Singapore Court of Appeal rightly accepted that the clemency power 
exercised by the Cabinet of Ministers vis-à-vis a prisoner on death row was 
subject to judicial review. 74 More importantly, the court held that if
“conclusive evidence is produced to the court to show that the Cabinet never 
met to consider the offender’s case at all, or that the Cabinet did not consider 
the [clemency] materials before it and merely tossed a coin” to determine the 
matter, the government would be in breach.75 But one must note the limited 
scope of the court’s review of the offender’s clemency petition in practice. 
For example, the Court of Appeal subsequently went on to hold that the
offender had no right to petition for clemency, had no right to be heard 
during the clemency process, and had no right to see the clemency materials 
71 Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 12. 
72 Malaysian Trade Union Congress v. Menteri Tenaga, [2014] M.L.J. 92. at para. 68. 
73 Id. at para. 71.
74 Yong Vui Kong v. Attorney General, [2011] 2 SLR 1189. 
75 Id. at [para. 83].
 
                                                            
440 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
 
placed before the Cabinet.76 If this is so, one does wonder how, in practice, 
the offender would ever prove with “conclusive evidence” that the Cabinet 
had never met to discuss his or her case, let alone find out that the Ministers 
had tossed a coin to decide the matter. Unless there is a whistleblower, 
privy to the Cabinet’s deliberations (or lack thereof), who is willing to come 
forward, the likelihood that any such constitutional review is taking place in 
Singapore is imaginary at best.77 As Professor Michael Hor rightly laments, 
“the door [to judicial review of the clemency power] is open, but the crack is 
too small for anyone to pass through.”78
Singapore and Malaysia have a semi-permanent form of government 
in power, and where a dominant, disciplined political party or coalition is in 
control, the less space domestic courts have to operate.79 Where legislative 
and executive power is consolidated in a single party or coalition, the 
dominant government can display its displeasure more easily by eliminating 
judicial review or even ousting the judges themselves. Constitutional review 
does not operate in a political vacuum; where judges are significantly 
constrained by the actions of other political actors, judicial review of state 
action becomes merely an exercise in tokenism.
C. Vacuous Judicial Doctrines
The converse of symbolic review is the judicial creation of vacuous 
doctrines that mask robust intervention under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation. This article focuses on arguably the most vacuous of such 
judicial doctrines, the implied “basic structure” doctrine, wherein the 
judiciary determines the unwritten “essential features” of the Constitution 
that are beyond any formal constitutional change.80 Within Asia, the more 
active courts in India and Taiwan have enforced this “basic structure”
doctrine by imposing implied constraints on the substantive content of 
76 Id. at [para. 135].
77 One must also note that under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act in Singapore, it is an offense
for a person to reveal, directly or indirectly, any information “to which he has had access, owing to his 
position as a person who holds or has held office under the Government.” 
78 Hor, supra note 53, at 154.  
79 PO JEN YAP, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA 78 (2015). 
80 In contrast, Germany and Brazil have constitutions that expressly enumerate provisions that 
may never be amended. For example, Articles 1(1) and 79(3) of the German Basic Law provide that any 
constitutional amendment “affecting the division of the Federation into Länder” or violating human dignity 
is prohibited. Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], translation at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html. In the same vein, Article 60(4) of the Brazilian Constitution expressly 
proscribes any constitutional amendments that seek to abolish federalism, universal suffrage, the separation 
of powers, or individual rights. Constituição Federal [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 60(4). 
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constitutional amendments and have invalidated any offending constitutional 
amendments for perceived violations.
In Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, the Supreme Court of India, by a 
7-to-6 majority, invalidated part of the 25th Amendment of the Indian 
Constitution, which provided that any law passed with a declaration that it 
was intended to give effect to the Directive Principles on the state’s socio-
economic policy could not be “called in question in any court on the ground 
that it does not give effect to such policy.”81 The majority judges argued 
that such an amendment attempted to eliminate judicial review and thus 
violated an implied “essential feature” of the Indian Constitution, and was 
therefore unconstitutional. Since Kesavananda, the Supreme Court of India 
has invalidated constitutional amendments on four other occasions for 
violating the Constitution’s implied basic structure. 82 Similarly, in J.Y. 
Interpretation No. 499, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan invalidated a 
constitutional amendment enacted by the Taiwanese National Assembly (an 
unelected legislative branch of government), which sought to extend its own 
term of office by allowing political parties with seats in the Legislative Yuan 
(Taiwan’s primary legislative chamber) to “elect” delegates to the Assembly.
The impugned constitutional amendment was declared inconsistent with 
democracy and human rights principles, fundamental norms that were 
deemed part of the implied “unchangeable provisions” in the Taiwanese 
Constitution.83
Upon close examination, judicial enforcement of the implied 
“essential features” doctrine nevertheless raises particular questions. Given 
that the texts of these constitutions are silent on which features are so basic 
or fundamental that they are beyond abrogation, any judicially created lists 
of such norms are open to debate and “cannot be objectively deduced or 
passively discerned in a viewpoint-free way.” 84 Even in the Indian 
Kesavananda case, judges were not unanimous on which elements would 
constitute the basic structure of the Constitution. For example, only four 
judges considered secularism as forming part of the unamendable basic 
structure in India, while a different plurality of judges viewed the unity and 
81 Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.
82 See Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 AIR 1975 SC 2299; Minerva Mills v. Union of India, 
AIR 1980 SC 1789; P Sambamurthy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 663; L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125.
83 J.Y. Interpretation No. 199 (Council of Grand Justices: Const. Ct. March 24, 2000). 
84 Laurence Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: in Defence of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 433, 440 (1983).
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sovereignty of the nation 85 as a core element. 86 More interestingly, one 
Indian judge considered that parliamentary democracy is part of the 
Constitution’s implied fundamental features and such a system of 
government may not be abrogated via a constitutional amendment.87 The 
difficulty of identifying what exactly are the implied “essential features” of a 
constitution was exposed by Ray J. in his dissenting opinion in Kesavananda:
To find out essential or non-essential features is an exercise in 
imponderables. When the Constitution does not make any 
distinction between essential and non-essential features it is 
incomprehensible as to how such a distinction can be made . . . 
On what touchstone are the essential features to be measured?
Is there any yardstick by which it can be gauged?88
Furthermore, even if one accepts that fundamental rights and judicial 
review form the inalienable core of any constitutional state committed to the 
rule of law, it may not always be self-evident whether an impugned 
constitutional amendment violates these norms in the specific disputes
before the court. The trouble with the elusive, divine rule of law ideal is not 
that people will disagree with its normative force in the abstract, but that this 
higher-order law, if enforceable, must be given substance and applied. 89
Judges do not uphold the rule of law in the abstract, but have to apply the 
sacrosanct constitutional norms to particularized facts that come before 
them.90 While unelected judges may stand above the rancor of politics and 
are arguably more impartial vis-à-vis the political branches of government, it 
is this insulation, as well as the professional homogeneity of the bench, that 
limits judges’ access to the requisite empirical evidence they need to make a 
fully informed constitutional judgment. Therefore, even if human rights as a 
general principle may never be abrogated, it is unclear why judges’ 
perception of certain constitutional liberties in every concrete context would 
always be superior and should always trump the amending body’s 
conception each time, such that all constitutional amendments may come 
under the pruning knife of judges. Indeed, pursuant to the “basic structure”
doctrine, the scope of the constitutional amendment power is ultimately 
85 Kesavananda Bharati, AIR 1973 SC 1461 at para. 704 (Hegde and Mukherjea J.J.), para. 620 
(Shelat and Grover J.J.).
86 Id. at para. 316 (Sikri C.J.), para. 620 (Shelat and Grover J.J.), para. 1480 (Khanna J.).
87 Id. at para. 1206 (Reddy J.).
88 Id. at para. 949 (Ray J.).
89 J.A.G. Griffith, The Brave New World of Sir John Laws, 63 MOD. L. REV. 159, 165 (2000).
90 Po Jen Yap, Defending Dialogue, supra note 22, at 538. 
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circumscribed by what a handful of judges may think constitutes the 
Constitution’s proper limits. In reality, the implied “basic structure”
doctrine is no more than a constitutional fig leaf to disguise judges’ 
unspoken political agenda. 
In Taiwan, prior to the issuance of J.Y. Interpretation No. 499, 
constitutional amendments could only be proposed and passed by National 
Assembly delegates, who were all unelected. The National Assembly was a 
political institution that was highly unpopular with the public, as its 
existence harkened back to the authoritarian era in Taiwan’s history when 
elections were suspended and the term of the delegates extended 
indefinitely.91 The public was clearly in favor of abolishing the National 
Assembly and having the Legislative Yuan (the primary legislative chamber) 
take over its constitutional functions. In 1999, however, the Assembly 
delegates, by anonymous voting, once again passed a constitutional 
amendment to prolong their term.  In response to the political impasse and to 
vindicate popular demand, the Constitutional Court of Taiwan intervened 
decisively and ended the National Assembly’s reign in Taiwan.92
As for India, the “basic structure” doctrine was first conceived and 
developed as a judicial response to the legislative excesses of the Indira 
Gandhi government, which had relied on a supine Parliament to effect 
constitutional changes that the “hyper-executive” government unilaterally 
wanted. Following a landslide victory at the 1971 polls, the Congress Party 
headed by Indira Gandhi was able to pass constitutional amendments with 
remarkable ease. The 25th Amendment was passed to insulate Gandhi’s 
socialist policies from judicial review. In response to rising political unrest
after 1973, a State of Emergency was declared in 1975, which led to the 
suspension of fundamental rights and the detention of opposition 
91 See Chien-Chih Lim, Majoritarian Judicial Review, 9 NAT. TAIWAN U.L. REV. 103 (2014). See 
also Ming-Sung Kuo, Moving Towards a Nominal Constitutional Court? Critical Reflections on the Shift 
from Judicial Activism to Constitutional Irrelevance in Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics, 25 WASH. INT’L 
L.J. 595, 598–99.
92 In 2005, Article 12 of the Amendment of the Taiwan (Republic of China) Constitution was passed 
and it so reads: “Amendment of the Constitution shall be initiated upon the proposal of one-fourth of the 
total members of the Legislative Yuan, passed by at least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting 
attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by electors 
in the free area of the Republic of China at a referendum held upon expiration of a six-month period of 
public announcement of the proposal, wherein the number of valid votes in favour exceeds one-half of the 
total number of electors. The provisions of Article 174 of the Constitution shall not apply.”  MINGUO 
XIANFA art. 12 (1947) (Taiwan), https://www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/ Taiwan_2005.pdf (with
Amendments through 2005).
 
                                                            
444 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
 
politicians. 93 The Constitution was also amended several more times in 
quick succession.94 Specifically, in response to a lower court’s finding that 
the Prime Minister had violated electoral laws and was disqualified from 
holding public office for six years, the 39th Amendment was passed to 
insulate the Prime Minister’s election from judicial inquiry and render 
pending proceedings in respect of such elections null and void. 95
Furthermore, the 42nd Amendment made nearly sixty significant changes to 
the Indian Constitution, which included an express elimination of judicial 
review over constitutional amendments.96 The judges were convinced that if 
they did not intervene, all vestiges of democracy in India would eventually 
be removed.97
These Asian judges, when enforcing the implied “basic structure”
doctrine, would emphatically argue that they are impartially applying pre-
determined rules, and are constrained by a distinctive methodology of legal 
reasoning that is closely tethered to their nation’s Constitution and its 
history. 98 Nonetheless, as discussed above, there is no definite way by 
which judges can discern and decide what these core features are and 
whether they are violated on the facts of a particular case. The doctrine is 
inherently vacuous and has been judicially conceived merely as a 
mechanism to prevent an authoritarian government from harnessing the 
amending process to “extend its own life indefinitely” or to establish 
totalitarianism.99 The sheer attractiveness of this “basic structure” doctrine 
(to judges) lies in the fact that it purports to draw authority from the nation’s 
foundational instrument and allows judges to sustain the myth that they are 
merely fulfilling the mandates of the Constitution, when they are in effect 
93 RAMACHANDRA GUHA, INDIA AFTER GANDHI: THE HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S LARGEST 
DEMOCRACY 491–99 (2007).
94 See Mahendra Pal Singh, India, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 177–
81 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
95 In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299, a majority on the Indian Supreme 
Court invalidated the impugned part of the 39th Amendment, which had sought to insulate the Prime 
Minister’s election from judicial review, on the basis that it violated the implied ‘basic features’ doctrine, 
but the Court also unanimously upheld the validity of her election on the facts. For an insightful discussion 
on the history of the case, see GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: A HISTORY 
OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 318–24 (1999).
96 In Minerva Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789, the Supreme Court unanimously 
invalidated Article 368(4) of the Indian Constitution, which ousted any judicial review over constitutional 
amendments.   
97 See O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: SUMMITS AND
SHALLOWS 53–72 (2008).
98 See generally Lizzie Barmes, Adjudication and Public Opinion, 118 L.Q. REV. 600 (2002).
99 Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 at para. 704 (Shelat and Grover J.J.).
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unilaterally introducing a political safeguard against legislative worse-case 
scenarios.
III. CONCLUSION
The constitutional fig leaves used by Asian judges seek to obscure the 
strategic political choices judges make for both liberal and conservative 
causes. In Singapore and Malaysia, where courts are confronted with a 
semi-permanent regime in power, reform-minded judges can typically bring 
about changes only at “the margins of political life.”100 Though both former 
British colonies have retained the Westminster system of government, which 
is predicated on the separation of powers, the anemic state of the courts’
jurisprudence suggests that their constitutional bills of rights are no more 
than paper tigers. 101 Nevertheless, by deploying legal fig leaves and 
maintaining some form of perceived legitimacy, Singaporean and Malaysian 
judges passively lend a “gloss of legitimacy to the authoritarian regime of 
which they are a part, precisely because they are a part of it.”102 As for the 
liberal courts in India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, these fig leaves provide 
constitutional cover for their activism. Insofar as judges purport to draw 
authority from the constitutional powers vested by their territory’s supreme 
law, they can deflect any criticisms that they have made unwarranted 
incursions into the legislative sphere.
So, perhaps, we should not completely chafe against these 
constitutional fig leaves, for they do serve an important social function by
preserving judicial legitimacy.103 The judicial invocation of such fig leaves 
allows everyone to keep up appearances. Removing these legal loincloths 
would do nothing but reveal to the world the ugly truth of what we already 
all know: the emperor really has no clothes.104 Whether this game is worth 
the candle is a discussion we would leave for another day.
100 Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa, Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian 
Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 15 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).
101 Thio Li-ann, An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional Adjudication,
27 H.K. L.J. 152, 152–53 (1997).
102 Ginsburg & Moustafa, supra note 99, at 15.
103 Forsyth, supra note 1, at 136.
104 Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1. 
 
                                                            
